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Levie: The 1977 Geneva Protocols

PROS AND CONS OF THE 1977 PROTOCOL I
by
HOWARD S. LEVIE'

There are many provisions of value to be found in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Protocol ).Unfortunately, there
are also a number of provisions which would have been better left undrafted.
This discussion will be limited to several provisions, or groups of provisions,
which appear to be major advances in the humanitarian law of war - and several provisions, or groups of provisions, which appear to be retrogressive. Obviously, neither list will be all-inclusive; to make them so would require a listing
and discussion of practically every substantive article in the Protocol. In fact,
inasmuch as the lists must necessarily be rather short, it is extremely difficult
to decide which "good" and which "bad" provisions should be included. Unquestionably, other students of the Protocol would not entirely agree with the
selections to be found herein. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the fact
that an article is considered to be an advance in the humanitarian law of war
does not necessarily mean that the writer believes that it is as well drafted as it
could have been or that all of its parts should have been included therein.
First, let us identify and discuss those provisions which appear to be major advances in the humanitarian law of war. Articles 48 to 56, inclusive, of
the 1977 Protocol I are concerned with the general protection of members of
the civilian population, that is, non-combatants, from the hazards of war. This
is a subject which was not included in the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons,2 which is primarily concerned with the protection of
civilian enemy aliens in national territory,3 civilian residents of occupied territory,' and civilian internees.' Article 51 of the Protocol contains provisions
prohibiting all attacks directed against the civilian population, including terror
attacks and indiscriminate attacks. "Terror attacks" are those which have little
or no military significance and which are really conducted in order to create
panic and terror in the civilian population. "Indiscriminate attacks" are those
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Saint Louis University Law School; former Stockton Professor of International
Colonel. JAGC. USA
Law. Naval War College; Adjunct Professor, Salve Regina College, Newport. R.I.:
(Ret.).
IProtocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I,June 8, 1977, 16 I.LM. 1391 [hereinafter cited as Protocol II. D. SCHINDLER & J. TOMAN. THE LAWSOF ARMED CONFLICTS 551 12d ed., 1981) (hereinafter cited as
S(HINDItER & TOMAN).
2

'onvention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. August 12. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516.
T.I.A.S. No. 3365 [hereinafter cited as Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons]:
SHINt)IER& TOMAN supra note I,at 427.
Ibid. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons, supra note 2,at art. 35-46.
11d. at art. 47-78.
1Id. at art. 79-135.
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that were common during World War 1I in which, when a city contained
several separate military targets, the entire city was bombed, without regard to
the disproportionate loss of civilian life. This series of articles also prohibits: (i)
attacks on civilian objects which make no effective contribution to military activities;6 (2) attacks on historic monuments, works of art, and places of worship;7 (3) attacks on objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and irrigation works;8 (4) attacks which would result in widespread,
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment;9 and (5)attacks on
works and installations containing dangerous forces, that is, dams, dykes, and
nuclear electric generating stations."t
Article 75 is labeled "Fundamental guarantees" - but it is even more
than that. First, it provides that it applies to persons affected by a situation
referred to in Article I of the Protocol (which will be discussed below in the
second list"), who are in the power of a Party to the conflict, and who do not2
benefit from more favorable treatment under the 1949 Geneva Conventions
or the Protocol. It then prohibits any adverse distinction in the treatment of
such persons "based upon race, color, sex, language, religion or belief, political
or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status, or any
other similar criteria." Next it prohibits violence to the life, health, or physical
or mental well-being of protected persons, listing a number of specific examples, such as murder, torture, outrages upon personal dignity, the taking of
hostages, collective punishments, etc. Then it provides that any person arrested, detained, or interned for actions relating to the conflict must be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for the action;
and that, if he is tried, it must be by an impartial and regularly constituted
court which applies "the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure." Those principles are then enumerated in some detail. The list includes
just about all of the familiar judicial protections except that, understandably.,
there are no provisions for grand or petit juries. (The term "understandably" is
used because except in countries which follow the English common law there
"Protocol I supra note I. at art. 52. 16 I.1,.M. at 1414.
/d. at art. 53.
'Id. at art. 54.
"Id. at art. 55, 16 I.L.M. at 1415.
'ld. at art. 56. 16 I.L.M. at art. 1415, art. 35(31, 16 I.L.M. at 1409.
"See p. 5, infra.
"in addition to the Civilians Convention cited in note 2, supra, these consist of:
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; SCHINDLER & TOMAN supra note 1, at 305.
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363; SCHINDLER &TOMAN supra note I

at 333.
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364; SCHINDLER& TOMAN supra note 1, at 355.
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are no grand juries and where there are petit juries they differ substantially
from those known to us.) Finally, there is a provision guaranteeing to persons
tried for war crimes, including grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or the Protocol, the protections of this Article as a minimum. (Itis of interest to note that, despite the urging of a number of the more developed nations, the Third World countries repeatedly refused to make this article
specifically applicable to mercenaries, although some of them did state that
they would do so.)13
Three articles set forth the obligations of the parties to the conflict to
repress grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol
and to suppress other breaches. Article 85 sets forth what are such breaches
and makes them "war crimes."' 4 Under Article 86 superiors are stated to be
responsible for the breaches committed by their subordinates
if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time that he [the subordinate] was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
Similarly, Article 87 provides that military commanders are required "to prevent, and where necessary, to suppress and to report to competent authorities"
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Protocol; commanders
have a duty to ensure that their subordinates are familiar with their obligations
thereunder; and any commander who is aware that any of his subordinates are
going to commit, or have committed, a breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions or of the Protocol is required to take steps to prevent such a violation
and, if it has been committed, to initiate disciplinary or penal action against the
violators.'" Unfortunately, a parallel provision which would have placed limitations on the defense of "superior orders," that is, the claim by the subordinate
that he committed the violation under orders of his superior officer, was rejected because of fears that it would encourage disobedience of orders and thus
adversely affect discipline. 6
Those, then, are the articles or groups of articles selected as constituting
major advances in the humanitarian law of war. Now, let us look at those articles and groups of articles which appear to be a step backward or to have failed
in their purpose.
Article 1(4) was probably the most controversial provision to come before
the Diplomatic Conference which drafted the 1977 Protocol 1. Under
133 H. LEVIE. PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS: PROTOCOL I TO THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS 33-52 passim

(1979-8 1)[hereinafter cited as LEVIEJ.
4See also Protocol 1,supra note I, at art. 11(4), 16 I.L.M. at 1401.
"Articles 86 and 87 relate to what is known as "command responsibility." Protocol I, supra note 1, at art. 86,
87, 16 l.L.M. at 1428-29.
6
1 Published
See LEVIE,by
supra
note 13.
IdeaExchange@UAkron,
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customary international law the so-called "wars of national liberation" had
always been considered to be civil wars and to be governed by the rules applicable to non-international armed conflicts. Article 1(4) would change that
and would make them international conflicts, regulated by the laws applicable
in this latter type of conflict. It brings within the ambit of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and of the 1977 Protocol I "armed conflicts in which people are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist
regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination." It is undoubtedly
one of the major reasons why the United States and some other countries will
not ratify the 1977 Protocol 1.
Article 44 is a provision implementing Article 1(4). In order to give additional protection to the members of national liberation armies the Diplomatic
Conference elected to abandon the four requirements for a legal combatant,
three of which had had their genesis in Article 2 of the Oxford Manual on the
Laws and Customs of War on land, 7 and all four of which were subsequently
set forth in detail in Article 1 of the Regulations attached to the 1899 Hague
Convention No. 11,18 Article 1 of the Regulations attached to the 1907 Hague
Convention No. IV,' 9 Article I of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention, 20 and Article 4 of the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention.21 Those
requirements were: (1)being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (2) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (3) carrying arms openly; and (4) conducting their operations in accordance with the
law of war. Now the only requirement is that the individual combatant carry
his arms openly while visibly deploying for an attack and during actual
military engagements. He need not wear anything to identify him as a combatant - which will undoubtedly have a detrimental effect on the other attempts
to protect the civilian population from the hazards of armed conflict because of
the difficulties of identification; and even though he need not comply with the
law of war, this Article assures him of all the protection which that law provides. (Incidentally, while it was extremely unfortunate that many of the provisions of this Article were included in the Protocol, the writer does not share the
fears of the Reagan Administration that they will serve as a basis for the claim
by terrorists that they come within its provisions and that they are, therefore,

11J.Scor, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 28 (1916); SCHINDLER &TOMAN
supra note I,at 35.
'"Convention No. 11with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (with annexed Regulations), July 29, 1899, 32 STAT. 1893; SCHINDLER& TOMAN supra note I, at 57.
"Convention No. IV with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land (with annexed Regulations),
October 18, 1907, 36 STAT. 2227; SCHINDLER&TOMAN supra note 1,at 57.
2
OConvention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 STAT. 2021, 118 L.N.T.S.
343; SCHINDLER&&TOMAN,supra note 1,at 271.
2
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.

3364.
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22
entitled to prisoner-of-war status when taken into custody.)

Articles 5 and 90, while concerned with completely different matters,
have the same defect - they require that the adverse belligerents reach an
agreement during the course of hostilities, something very difficult to obtain.
Article 5 is an attempt to ensure that there will always be a Protecting Power,
a Neutral Power charged with protecting the interests of one belligerent in the
territory of the other. This includes the protection of civilians, internees,
prisoners of war, etc., and its importance cannot be overemphasized. Although
all of the belligerents had Protecting Powers during World War 11, the
Falklands conflict is probably the only one of a hundred or more international
armed conflicts which have occurred since 1945 in which there were true Protecting Powers. In its Commentary on the draft article which was submitted to
the Diplomatic Conference on this subject the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) said that its purpose was "to strengthen the system of Protecting Powers."23 While there is a provision for the submission by each
belligerent to the ICRC of a list of five Neutral Powers acceptable to act as
Protecting Powers, with any Power named on both lists to be requested to act
as such, this will probably turn out to be a wasted effort. (In a war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, it can be envisaged that one of the
NATO Powers would submit a list containing the names of such countries as
Switzerland, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, and India, while the Warsaw Pact
Power would submit the names of such countries as Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua,
North Korea, and Vietnam!) There is a further provision to the effect that if
this operation fails, the belligerents will accept the ICRC as a substitute for the
Protecting Power. However, that provision goes on to state that this is "subject
to the consent of the Parties to the conflict" - and with their phobia concerning spies, occasioned, no doubt, by their own propensities in this respect, no
Communist country has ever permitted the ICRC (or any other truly impartial
international humanitarian organization) to function on its territory.
Article 90 is labeled "International Fact-Finding Commission." It originated during the course of the Diplomatic Conference and its objective was to
provide for an automatic method of determining the validity of allegations of
violations of the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977
Protocol 1. An example of the need for such a provision occurred during the
Korean Conflict. North Korea, supported by Communist China and the Soviet
Union, contended that the United States was using bacteriological weapons.
The United States immediately proposed an investigation of that allegation by
the ICRC and the World Health Organization of the United Nations. The
"See, e.g., Feith, Law in the Service of Terror TEREST, Fall 1985, at 36, 42-47.
23

The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol.

NATL IN-

1NTL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

(1973).
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Communist nations would not accept this proposal and, instead, established
their own "Scientific Commission" which, not unexpectedly, found that the
allegation was true. The final chapter of this incident occurred when, some
years later, a book was published in the Soviet Union in which every instance
of the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare was set forth - and there is
no mention of the Korean incident!24 At Geneva the Soviet bloc opposed any
provision for an International Fact-Finding Commission which would be empowered to investigate any allegation of violations basically on the ground that
it would be a violation of their sovereignty - an assertion made by them
whenever there is a proposal for an action which they cannot veto. Once again
the provision ended up by requiring consent unless the belligerents involved
had previously both filed statements accepting the jurisdiction of the Commission similar to the statements filed with the International Court of Justice
under Article 36(2) of the Statute of that Court. No Communist State has ever
filed such a statement with the Court; and it is hardly likely that any of them
will file such a statement with respect to the jurisdiction of the Commission;
nor will they permit investigations on their territory by impartial bodies.
These are a few of the advantages and a few of the disadvantages that are
to be found in the 1977 Protocol 1. Unfortunately, it appears that the United
States, and other nations, believe that, however, many good provisions there
are, the unacceptable provisions are so numerous and so weighty as to
preclude its ratification.25

2

'Viney, Research Policy: Soviet Union, in CBW:

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

133 (S. Rose ed.

1969).
2

At the time of writing (January 1986), the 1977 Protocol I had been ratified or acceded to by 54 nations, including Denmark and Norway from the NATO countries, none from the Warsaw Pact countries, and by the
People's Republic of China.
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